cid 7df268c3cc7af6632c703b1c0ea84852493693967704b7acf7bffbacd731f486 · original · open access · via openalex
Title: Implementing and Evaluating Post-Quantum DNSSEC in CoreDNS Authors: Julio Gento Suela; Javier Blanco-Romero; Florina Almenares Mendoza; Daniel Díaz-Sánchez Venue: ACM International Conference on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems (MSWiM) Year: 2025 Canonical: doi:10.1109/mswim67937.2025.11308970 URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/mswim67937.2025.11308970 Collector: openalex OA: true ABSTRACT The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to current secure service, application and/or protocol implementations that rely on RSA and ECDSA algorithms, for instance DNSSEC, because public-key cryptography based on number factorization or discrete logarithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. This paper presents the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into CoreDNS to enable quantum-resistant DNSSEC functionality for the first time. We have developed a plugin that extends CoreDNS with support for five PQC signature algorithm families: ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA. Our implementation maintains compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows while providing on-the-fly signing using quantum-resistant signatures. A benchmark has been performed and performance evaluation results reveal significant trade-offs between security and efficiency. The results indicate that while PQC algorithms introduce operational overhead, several candidates offer viable compromises for transitioning DNSSEC to quantum-resistant cryptography.