cid 5e13602fe87abe389b5d3520ecc29ee75af575f083662013759139a2812423b0 · original · via openalex
Title: Cosigning to Curb Corruption Authors: John D. Ciorciari Venue: Stanford University Press eBooks Year: 2021 Canonical: doi:10.11126/stanford/9781503613669.003.0009 URL: https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9781503613669.003.0009 Collector: openalex OA: false ABSTRACT This chapter analyzes the possibilities for sharing authority outside the judicial sphere in order to curb corruption. It concentrates on the seminal experiment in this area: the Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia, created in 2005, which granted external actors cosigning authority with certain key Liberian officials. GEMAP was able to deliver important service benefits to Liberia during the tenure of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, thus helping to justify deep international involvement in Liberia’s domestic economic affairs. The case nevertheless shows the limits of sovereignty-sharing mechanisms in implanting sustainable reforms when domestic commitment ebbs and problematic incentive structures remain.